See S.D. TEX. LOCAL R., App. C., available at http://www.txsd.uscourts.gov/dclclrl/dclr2oos. pdf (describing proper courtroom etiquette but not referring to seating). 
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See, e.g., Mahon v. Prunty, No. 96-55411, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2122, at *6 ( 9 th Cir. Feb. 6, 1997) ("[T] he court did not abuse its discretion by seating defendants closer to the jury."); United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 122o, 1226 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Where . . . [defense] counsel makes an objection to the seating arrangements, a trial judge may deem it appropriate to make the choice by some more neutral way than tradition or a race to the 'best' seat.").
there are also persuasive arguments, grounded in history and precedent, for why a trial judge should allow a well-behaved criminal defendant to choose for himself where he will sit. In Part I, I suggest that the criminal defendant's autonomy to choose his seat is an important aspect of the American courtroom tradition. In Part II, I argue that the defendant's well-established freedom to control some aspects of his appearance before the jury-by wearing civilian clothes rather than prison garb, for example -implies a freedom to choose the place of his appearance as well. Part III addresses the government's response to Ramsey's letter.
I. THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S JOURNEY FROM DOCK TO COUNSEL TABLE
Over the last two centuries American courts have granted the criminal defendant more and more autonomy to choose where he will sit during trial. Our courts have allowed the defendant first to leave the "prisoner's dock" -the railed pen in which he once stood during trial -and then to join his lawyer on the other side of the "bar," even as England and Canada have continued to confine the defendant in the dock. 1 The scope and consistency of this trend suggests that assigning the criminal defendant to a particular seat is out of keeping with American tradition.
Abolishing the prisoner's dock was a decisive break with historical practice, because the dock was nearly as old as the English courtroom itself. Fifteenthcentury illustrations of an English criminal trial show the accused standing front-and-center before the judges, with a marshal at his side. [hereinafter THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE] (describing the state courthouse in Marin County, California). Another concern is that scary or unattractive defendants may well prefer to sit farther away from the jury's scrutiny. Once freed from the dock, the American criminal defendant then crossed the bar that separated spectators from participants, and took a seat beside his lawyer. One such migration is recorded in a decision of the Tennessee Superior Court in 18o6. That court believed that the "proper place" for a prisoner who was "in custody" was behind the bar, because "[s]trictly speaking, no person has a right to go into the bar but attorneys.' ' , 8 Nevertheless, the court conceded that the old custom was changing, and permitted a prisoner on bail to cross the bar and sit beside his lawyer.' 9 13. Surviving plans of seventeenth-century courthouses show a prisoner's dock, located far away from the lawyers in the "well." Id. at 82-84, 87-88 (reproducing plans of English assizes). Graham has argued that it is likely that a similar enclosure was used as early as the sixteenth century; the term "dock" was first recorded in 1586. Id. at 55. Salem "the usual place for prisoners, in all capital cases, is in the dock, or prisoner's bar"). A dock also appears in the circular courtroom of the Old Berkshire County Courthouse, built in 1815 in Lenox, Massachusetts. THE AMERicAN COURTHOUSE, supra note lo, at 234 (reproducing the floor plan). The Old New Castle County Courthouse in New Castle, Delaware, built in 1730, also contained a dock that, though not elevated, was cordoned off from the lawyers' tables by railings. Id. at 232 (reproducing a sketch of the courthouse). 15. See, e.g., State v. Kupis, 179 A. 641 (Del. 1935) (reffising, on an interlocutory appeal, the defendant's request to leave the dock as "contrary to the well settled practice in this state"). But see Young v. Callahan, 70o F.2d 32, 36 n.5 (1st Cir. 1983) ("We understand that ... the dock... is no longer used in Delaware during the course of a trial.").
16. Joel Prentiss Bishop, in the 1895 edition of his treatise on criminal procedure, opined that "probably" the "strict English rules" on where a prisoner must stand were no longer enforced in U.S. courts, "[a]nd so, the author submits, it should be." JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRMINAL PROCEDURE S 954, at 57 2 ( 4 th ed. 1895).
The dock disappeared in part because the earliest American trials were held in taverns, meetinghouses, town halls, and private homes, which lacked the elaborate English furniture, 2 " and in part, perhaps, because an emerging egalitarian spirit rebelled at the idea of denying the defendant the autonomy to choose his own seat. Breaking with the English custom, American courts permitted the criminal defendant first to leave the dock, and then to pass over the bar and sit at the lawyers' tables. It would be in keeping with that tradition to allow him one step more, over to the table near the jury.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO "PRESENT HIMSELF IN HIS BEST
POSTURE"
Most states got rid of their docks one courthouse at a time, and without appellate litigation." When a defendant did try to argue his way out of the dock, his most successful claim appears to have been that the distance between his pen and the counsel table impeded his right to consult with his lawyer," an argument that may also have been the most convenient constitutional shorthand through which appellate courts could express their distaste for assigned seats. A corollary of that proposition is that the defendant has an affirmative right to control his appearance. Thus, a district court has held that members of a religious cult may wear their uniforms to trial -even when those uniforms might intimidate the jury. 7 Florida's courts have held that a criminal defendant has a First Amendment right to wear sweatshirts with religious symbols.S Virginia's courts have held it an abuse of discretion to refuse an active duty naval officer permission to wear his dress uniform, because "it is inappropriate for a trial court to deny a courtroom participant the right to present himself in his best posture." 29 These cases tacitly acknowledge the obvious point: A defendant's appearance matters to the jury and can affect the outcome of a trial. If the state is forbidden from forcing a defendant to look guilty, then the state ought not to prevent him from looking innocent.
And if a defendant is permitted to choose the clothes that he will be seen wearing, then he should also be allowed to choose where, and at what distance, he will be seen, because his proximity to the jury will have enormous influence on how the jurors perceive him. In Judge Lake's courtroom, a defendant sitting at the near 30. EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966) . Hall identified four zones of space around the person: "intimate distance" (from six to eighteen inches); "personal distance" distance is used by "people who work together," 3 ' while persons at a public distance are outside the "circle of involvement" and are more likely to be perceived in a "formal style." 32 Professor Jeffrey S. Wolfe conducted his own test of juror perceptions and found that jurors consider lawyers to be more effective when they stand within social distance. 33 Manuals on trial advocacy agree with Wolfe's findings, and recommend that lawyers take the table nearest the jury M and deliver their arguments within social distance of the jury box. 3 " This evidence suggests that, especially in small courtrooms, where one sits matters as much as what one wears. For the same reasons that we permit the defendant to wear his Sunday best, so too should we allow him to choose a seat near the jurors who will judge him.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ASSIGNED SEATS ARE NOT PERSUASIVE
In its response to Ramsey's letter, the government warned Judge Lake that if Lay were to sit near the jury, he might "interact more freely with the jury through non-evidentiary means."
36 Certainly if Lay were to chat up the jurors, that would indeed be a problem -but assuming, as seems fair, that Lay would (from eighteen inches to four feet); "social distance" (from four to twelve feet); and "public distance" (over twelve feet away). Id. at 108-22.
31.
Id. at 115. government has traditionally been given the option of sitting closest to the jury because it bears the burden of proof."). It is hard to see how the burden of proof is relevant to seating arrangements, however.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal behave himself and sit quietly, why should his presence there be considered "non-evidentiary"?
There is good reason to think that a defendant's appearance, posture, and facial expressions are evidence, and ought to be considered by the jury. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that a jury will weigh and consider the defendant's physical appearance, even if the defendant never leaves his seat at the counsel table. 37 In this trial, because Lay does plan to leave his seat and to testify in his defense, 3s his credibility will be a central issue. His nonverbal reactions to hostile witnesses are "relevant" to his credibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
3 1 Judge Lake's decision to offer Lay a seat at the near table during his own case is laudable, but less than ideal: Lay's presence at the near table would have been most relevant during his confrontation with the witnesses against him, which occurred during the prosecution's case.
CONCLUSION
The seating arrangements of a courtroom are within the trial judge's discretion. When exercising that discretion, a judge should weigh a number of concerns, some of which-safety of jurors, for example, or avoidance of prejudice -may well lead her to seat a criminal defendant far from the jury. When a well-behaved defendant asks to sit near the jury, however, a judge should not deny his request on the basis of custom alone. By granting the defendant the autonomy to choose his own seat, a judge honors America's historic break with the English practice of confining the defendant in the dock, respects the defendant's right to appear before the jury in his best posture, and provides the jury with relevant, nonverbal evidence from the defendant's confrontation with hostile witnesses. 
